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Introduction
The last decade of Labour government in the UK has been associated with an ambitious programme of public service reforms. In England key reform initiatives have been directed at local government and those other units of devolved government responsible for delivering major services such as health. Indeed, the present Labour government has devoted more attention to local government than any of the three earlier post-war Labour governments. For s:\staff\repositories\fulltext\business school\5567\local government modernisation in england.doc traditionally, it has been the Conservative party which worried away at local government, initiating the three great postwar English local government reorganisations. In another break with Labour tradition, the government has celebrated and extended, rather than rolled back, the mixed economy of local service delivery inherited from the Conservatives. In particular, the government has inaugurated an intensive period of reform intended to "modernise" and reinvigorate English local councils (elsewhere in the UK the new devolved governments have responsibility for local government in their areas, Laffin 2007) . These English reforms have sought a "radical re-focussing of councils" traditional roles" and the elimination of the "old culture of paternalism and inwardness" (DETR 1998: 8, quoted in Bovaird and Martin 2003: 18) .
The government has looked to re-engineer local authorities as strategic leaders within their local communities, enabling services to be delivered rather than necessarily delivering all services themselves. The four successive stages of the Local Government Modernisation Agenda (LGMA), from1997 onwards, have involved twenty plus individual policies. These policies range from new performance management regimes (Best Value then Comprehensive Performance Assessments) to new council constitutions which require authorities to replace their traditional committee-based decision-making structures with an executive in the form of a leader-and-cabinet or an elected mayor, based on a distinction between "executive" and legislative" roles. Other notable LGMA policy initiatives include Local Public Service Agreements between central government and individual local authorities, requirements to establish "joined-up" local strategic partnerships and a new approach to local coordination in Local Area Agreements. A range of other policies are also included in the LGMA but are omitted from this article for reasons of space -these policies include funding competitions to be recognised as "Beacon Councils", new ethical codes for councillors and standards committees for councils.
The LGMA reforms offer a valuable case study of a central government"s capacity to manage change at the local level and underlines the dilemmas of reform confronting Labour as a social democratic government in the early 21 st century. Labour party interests have driven much of the policy and at least partly explain the apparently greater urgency the government has attached to town hall rather than Whitehall reform. In its pursuit of electability the party leadership remains suspicious of its own local government activists, especially any resurgence of the left and union power in local government which is perceived, among the Parliamentary Labour Party leadership, as having damaged Labour electorally in the turbulent 1980s (Entwistle and Laffin 2005) . In additional, falling electoral turnouts and unrepresentative councillors threaten the legitimacy of local government and the viability of local parties as the vital local-level underpinning for the national parties. Not least the key role of local authorities as responsible for a quarter of public spending and for key public services (especially education and social care) in England has always ensured the sustained interest of central policymakers.
This article reviews some of the evaluations commissioned by the local government ministry in England in its various organisational embodiments, presently as the Department of Community and Local Government (CLG). These evaluation studies cover all of the twenty
LGMA policies but exclude other policy initiatives directed at local government but emanating from the big public service departments, especially in education and health -a significant limitation as will be seen later. The second part discusses these findings in a broader political and historical context and identities some gaps in our knowledge of local government and politics as well as of centrallocal relations.
Summarising the LGMA Studies
The sheer range of LGMA policies raises the question of whether they represent a coherent programme of reform. Downe and Martin (2006: 472-1 ; see also Geddes and Martin 2000) identify four successive waves of LGMA policies with each wave driven by different aims and strategies with limited evidence of "any synergy between them". They concluded that the
LGMA was a case of evolution rather than planning. Central policy-makers tried out one set of modernisation initiatives then, when these appeared not to have succeeded, they introduced a new set. On top of the LGMA initiatives, the big service departments - (Davis et al. 2004 ). The
LGMA research implies that the big spending departments have eclipsed the role of the CLG as the local government-sponsoring department. The academic evaluators themselves conclude that their task was limited by their inability to adopt a "whole systems approach which can evaluate policy impacts across departmental boundaries" (Down and Martin 2006: 486) . When this limitation was discussed early on the evaluation programme, the then Department of Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR) ruled that it could only commission research which evaluated their policies not those of other departments and that to initiate joint, inter-departmental research would be too difficult and time-consuming to be worthwhile (Martin 2003) . A good example of the deep-seated nature of problems of interdepartmental coordination.
Local authorities emerge from the evaluation studies as largely passive recipients of central policy initiatives. Central policies eclipse local accountability. Members and officers reported that they were "following central government"s lead, rather than setting their own agendas"
and "the evidence suggests that to date the LGMA has encouraged an environment in which many authorities rely upon strong external pressure exerted by Government policies to motivate change" (Martin and Bovaird 2005: 86 (Ashworth and Skelcher 2005) . Even so, central initiatives were seen as "broadly congruent with their own authorities" local priorities", unlike those of the pre-1997
Conservative policies (Cowell and Martin 2003: 168) . Although Cowell and Martin do not tell us how far this congruency might reflect a Labour party consensus across the centrallocal divide at the time of their research, or whether such a consensus will disappear as more councils fall to the Conservatives as Labour succumbs to mid-term blues. Nonetheless, they identify significant local government frustration with central government. The government simultaneously demands that local authorities should become community leaders yet persists in allocating powers to bodies -such as schools, health agencies and housing associationsoutside the direct control of those local authorities (Cowell and Martin 2003: 169) .
The government, then, remains averse to any reforms associated with Big Government bureaucratic solutions. It has continued the Conservative"s stress on a mixed economy of provision at the local level, casting local authorities in an enabling rather than delivering role.
One key solution to local coordination problems are Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs) introduced under the Local Government Act 2000. Central policymakers see LSPs as "a more fluid set of institutional structures and relationships" which will remedy the "perceived deficiencies of traditional, large bureaucratic "silos"" (Geddes et al. 2007 ). LSPs have now been established in most localities. They are organisations, with no direct executive powers, which bring together the different parts of the public sector as well as the private, business, community and voluntary sectors in order to join up and plan their various activities. They are less centrally-prescribed than CPAs. Geddes et al. (2007) find that LSPs are struggling to reconcile their ambitious remit with the realities of both resource constraints and a questionable legitimacy given their "ambiguous relationship to local democratic accountability". In other words, tensions exist between LSPs, as a form of participatory democracy, and representative democracy, embodied in elected councillors. This tension is reflected in the "unease among local authorities and councillors about the potential leaching of power to LSPs, contributing to the fragmentation of accountability and dilution of local democracy (Geddes 2006: 82) . Nevertheless, the government is determined to expand the (2005) provide considerable evidence that the big Whitehall service departments are using the LPSAs to tighten their embrace of local authorities, although they are more cautious in their final conclusions. Those involved, from both central and local government, largely experienced the process of negotiation as "not a real negotiation" but rather as "central officials "telling" local officials how things are going to be" (Sullivan and Gillanders 2005: 562) . This experience was compounded by the relatively junior status of the civil servants involved who had little discretion to accommodate local authority requests.
Sullivan and Gillanders remain silent on the contribution of elected members -is the implication that these negotiations are left to the officers correct? The other major limitation of the LPSAs is the rationalistic, economic model underlying them. The assumption is that central government objectives and priorities can be cascaded down to the local level and that the causal mechanisms underlying social problems are well understood. In reality the process of agreeing targets is "hampered by a lack of understanding of cause and effect and inadequate data, and complicated by the need to meet ODPM"s "value for money" criteria" Rural Affairs, and elsewhere, and in the twelve departmental Capability Reviews.
How far have CPAs changed relationships within local authorities? Senior officers, in particular, face quite new (or is it just different?) pressures to act as leaders. They are now held responsible to an unprecedented extent for management failings (Entwistle et al. 2005 ).
It might be speculated that CPAs are both a threat to and an opportunity for chief executives and other senior officers. The threat has already been mentioned, but the opportunity may lay in how the CPA gives officers a new set of arguments for the primacy of management and, therefore, their own role. Or does the importance of the CPA inevitably suck the executive members into management? Or is there is a trend towards member-officer "co-leadership"?
with the CPA pressures creating a shared perspective between senior members and officers?
The broader political modernisation agenda has fuelled the professionalisation of political leadership. The greatly increased pay for executive members enables them to spend more time on service delivery issues, again with possible implications for the member-officer relationship (Entwistle et al. 2005) . The new political decision-making structures, Nonetheless, almost all the rest have adopted the leader-cabinet system with the separation of executive and scrutiny roles for councillors. Most authorities have adopted these new structures under central duress and have largely preserved "many of the institutional attributes of the past system" under the surface (Gains et al. 2005: 26) . Similarly, Leach and Copus (2004: 353) find that in most councils the scrutiny function remains underdeveloped as the result of "the intransigent nature of most party group behaviour". Thus the requirements to implement this model have largely reinforced existing trends towards the centralisation of decision-making within councils (John 2004) . Nonetheless, Gains et al. (2005) and John (2004) are also keen to stress is that these types of change take time to bed in and they detect a dynamic whereby as more and more authorities make them work, others are likely to follow.
Discussion: Key Themes and Future Research
This section develops the discussion further with the aim of placing some of these policy developments in a wider historical and political context. It identifies some key findings and hypotheses and proposes questions for further research. The discussion is organised in four sections: the persistence of centralism and the passivity of the locality, the resilience of departmentalism, the continuing significance of party and central-local relations.
The Persistence of Centralism and the Passivity of the Locality
The strong message of the LGMA studies is that central government is driving change with local authorities taking their cues from the centre rather than the locality. Stewart (2000: 101), a seasoned observer of British local government, notes that local government has been currently "curiously passive" with individual authorities experiencing central policies as imposed so that "metaphors that imply interaction, such as "partnership" or "resourceexchange", seem far away from the reality of central-local relationships as experienced in many authorities" (2000: 102). Certainly, he sees little evidence to support any alternative thesis along the lines of locally-based networks with a "self-governing" momentum stressed by Rhodes (1997) . It should be added that this passivity and deference towards the centre is the norm rather than the exception in the history of British local government. Past instances of local authority resistance to the centre, notably during the politically turbulent 1980s, have been historical anomalies. Even then, those Labour authorities which challenged the Conservative central government did so for partisan rather than territorial reasons (Lansley et al. 1989 ). The long-standing nationalisation of local politics has always limited the forces of localism.
Historically, policy-makers and reformers at the centre have sought to manage local authorities by influencing the officer structure and forming alliances with them usually against local politicians. This is exactly the reforming strategy which Edwin Chadwick and other reformers advocated in the mid nineteenth century (Laffin 1986: 37-40) . CPA is strongly in this tradition. It has worked because CPA has acquired the crucial support of local allies, mainly chief executives and other senior officers rather than among the elected members, essentially because the formers" career prospects and even survival have come to hinge on the CPA results. CPA has also worked because it was backed by an enforcement system capable of detailed monitoring and able to penalise errant authorities in the form of the Audit Commission with its powers of "naming-and-shaming". Thus, it could be proposed that the capacity of the centre to implement policies require, as necessary and sufficient conditions, the support of local allies plus an enforcement mechanism.
Nonetheless, the extent and specificity of central government intervention is historically unparalleled. As I have argued elsewhere (Laffin 2006 ) in more nuanced detail, during the postwar "Golden Age" of public service expansion the concerns over local autonomy were muted. Local authorities enjoyed sustained growth and mostly followed the centrallysponsored and profession-dominated consensus across the major policy areas. During their period of office, the Conservatives pursued a politics of austerity (arguably with limited impact on the overall levels of public expenditure) which involved them seeking detailed control over local government spending. Once New Labour entered office, Labour ministers sought to reinvest in the public services, especially after 2000. New Labour has increased spending but in a tightly controlled way, concerned to gain value for money but also to limit lower middle-level officials, whom they often perceive as having a less certain grasp of "how things work" than themselves. This anecdotal evidence suggests that GOs have some way to go if they are to fulfil the role identified by Treasury. That role would also suggest that GOs would need greater discretion than they presently enjoy. Yet the more discretion they enjoy, the less legitimacy they will have in the absence of any oversight from a regionally-elected level of government. Again there is scope for research to track how far GOs are acquiring an enhanced and "transformational" role. Meanwhile, at the local level LAAs could pose interesting and new political-bureaucratic challenges for senior councillors and officers -how do they seek to manage these partnerships? Are policy outcomes as well as processes changing? More generally, the growing complexity of the central-local relations system could be creating new possibilities for those in local authorities to use the system actively rather than passively as traditionally has been the case, but is this happening? Is complexity enabling authorities to respond flexibly to "local problems"? Do they as individual authorities take a strategic view of these and try to manage their relationship in such a way as to preserve some local discretion and/or implement their own priorities despite these planning systems?
The Resilience of Departmentalism
Paradoxically, although the LGMA studies are ostensibly about local government, they contain important findings about the current working of central government. The government has signally failed to impose a consistent strategy across its dealings with the devolved public services despite the pronounced centralising trends of both the Prime Minister and
Chancellor. Despite the rhetoric of "joined-up" government, the LGMA studies identify a wide range of policy inconsistencies in central government"s approach to local government.
These inconsistencies have left those in local authorities trying to manage upwards as they struggled to make up for the coordination deficit. Stoker (2004) argues that these policy inconsistencies reflect a strategy of "government by lottery". This policy randomness is actually a deliberate New Labour strategy intended to destabilise local actors to encourage them to unlearn old ways and embrace the new ways of working endorsed by the government. As Coulson (2004) argues, a more conventional explanation is both more plausible and economical. Thus these inconsistencies reflect Whitehall"s deeply departmentalised nature with ministers themselves competing with each other, pursuing new initiatives without considering how these fit into any overall strategy for government. Not least, of course, service ministers tend to favour greater central controls to advance their own services.
This finding of a resilient departmentalism confirms the findings of earlier Whitehall research studies. Marsh and colleagues, for instance, conclude that "despite the attempts to "join-up" government, departments continue to segment the operation of the executive" (Marsh et al. 2001: 249) . The recent capability reviews of central departments reach similar conclusions (the capability reviews are a central government version of the CPA but have narrower remits and are overseen by the Cabinet Office and not by an independent body). Nearly all the twelve Whitehall departments scrutinised to date are criticised for a lack of collaboration with other departments. CLG itself faces an uphill struggle to assert itself as the coordinating department for local government against the over-weaning influence of the service departments. Although the CLG Permanent Secretary is fighting back. In his response to his Department"s Capability review he proposes "delivery agreements" "with key government departments within the next six months, which [will] establish a shared view of the priority tasks we need to deliver together" (Cabinet Office 2006: 6) . Of course, coordination problems are endemic in government and policy-makers can never escape such tensions, perhaps contrary to received wisdom among some government advisers. Are these problems simply endemic? Or do they reflect, at least in part, political and/or bureaucratic failings quite specific to this government or to this period in time? Can a reinvigorated local government ministry, in the form of CLG, achieve its newly-stated or restated ambition of coordinating the service departments? Cowell and Martin (2003: 177) question whether existing policies will be able to achieve the types of joined-up government currently advocated by government. They identify a pay-off between greater vertical integration between central ministries and local delivery agencies and less horizontal integration at the local level. Thus supporting a working hypothesis that the stronger the vertical, top-down central-local structures, the weaker will be the horizontal relationships. This hypothesis, of course, implies that the central push for greater local "community leadership" conflicts with the pull of the compliance culture generated by tight central requirements and inspectorates. Thus CPA has had a greater impact on local authorities than political modernisation which lacks such allies and an enforcement mechanism.
The local branches of the national parties, not the least the Labour party as the main object of many of these reforms, remain resistant to reform. Pratchett (2004: 222) notes that over the last ten years the main political parties have further increased their dominance of local government, yet at the same time the decline in party membership poses pressing questions over the continuing effectiveness of the party as the democratic link between citizen and government. Copus (2004: 277) argues that the political parties have become exclusive, alienating rather than engaging citizens locally. The introduction of the "executivelegislative" distinction into local government, grouping councillors into "executive members"
and backbenchers sitting on "scrutiny" committees has been achieved less effective scrutiny than expected. Leach (2006: 136) , drawing on the LGMA studies, concludes that "many authorities have found it difficult to move away from the traditional agendas, processes and reports of the old committee system" which impede scrutiny.
The LSPs offer a potential alternative link between the citizen and government. Skelcher (2004, p. 41) accepts the continuing decline in traditional electoral politics but discerns "signs of a new politics emerging around some partnership activity in a way that mobilizes and engages citizens in the governance of their communities" but is not more specific. Of course, partnerships do not necessarily increase participation, as Skelcher recognises. Geddes (2006: 830) is pessimistic and sees LSPs as entrenching rather than challenging the status quo. external constraints on inter-authority variations in expenditure decisions (Danziger 1978, Sharpe and Newton 1984) and pinpoint a serious weakness of the Audit Commission"s approach to CPA. They find that those councils which enjoy the advantages of large size and economic prosperity are more likely to achieve high ratings than those which face diverse service needs. As they stress, this conclusion has important practical policy implications at a time when central government is making decisions to intervene or issue plaudits to authorities based on CPA ratings.
Central-Local Relations and the Non-Local Determinants of Local Policy
Although the LGMA studies are relevant to central-local relations, those relations remain under-researched. Yet, as the earlier discussion makes clear, a full understanding of local government requires an appreciation of the political and administrative dynamics at the national level. My own research, with a colleague, has shown how the intra-party politics of the Labour party shaped Best Value and other modernisation policies (Entwistle and Laffin 2005) and how the decline of professional influence nationally has had major implications for professional power and traditional departmental structures locally (Laffin and Entwistle 2000) . This research suggests that Dunleavy"s criticism of an earlier local government literature remains valid today for the LGMA studies -that they under-estimate the consequences for local policy outcomes of the non-local factors of national party control, the local government professions (or nowadays their fluctuating fortunes) and big business based outside the locality (Dunleavy 1980) . To this list, as local government has become local governance, four further sources of real or potential non-local influence can be added. Firstly, the other vertical policy hierarchies which have their own "siloed" interests -for example the health service, the Home Office plus the police and the Housing Corporation plus housing associations. Secondly, the inspectorates (such as the Audit Commission) which arguably have become key mechanisms whereby central policymakers learn about the state of local government. Thirdly, the new type of commercial service companies, like SERCO and CAPITA, which have come to play a prominent role in service delivery, initially in the more routine functions but increasingly in managing more complex tasks in education and other areas. Fourthly, the "mega-charities" which have become increasingly involved in service delivery and bring a different set of concerns to delivery from those of local authorities. The significance of these sources of policy influence, at both national and local levels, represent a vital agenda for further research (for more details see Laffin 2006) .
Conclusions
This review of the LGMA studies has sought to put a different, less official spin on the research findings generated by the LGMA research studies. Significant scope does exist for these findings to be interpreted in a wider historical and political context. Indeed, the LGMA case illustrate the need for research on public service reform to include analyses of the political origins of reform policies and the political-bureaucratic issues involved in their implementation. Specifically, in the case of LGMA these imperatives include those of party electability, managing intra-party tensions and the crucial relationship with the public sector unions. These imperatives are vital to any explanation of why New Labour has attached such importance to local government reform. Not least, too, future research needs to rediscover the value of studying local politics in the round, the impact of socio-economic factors on local policy outcomes and the vital role of central-local relations.
